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Let me first try to identify what kind of im-
balances should be addressed. Stimulated by 
the assurance of a long-term perspective of a 
period of low interest rates, positive-feedback 
trading may have pushed asset prices above 
fundamentals. Large unsustainable increases 
in asset prices pose a problem both on the 
domestic and on the global level. In the USA, 
there are indications that low interest rates 
encouraged households and businesses to build 
up debt and to artificially inflate the prices 
of houses, stocks, bonds and other assets. 
Household financial liabilities (as per cent of 
disposable personal income) increased in the 
USA from 87% in 1990 to more than 104% in 
2000 and up to 117% at the end of 2003. Debt 
payments of US households went up from 11% 
of disposable personal income in 1994 to more 
than 13% in 2002 and stabilised at that level as 
a result of the huge drop in interest rates (see 
Figure 1).
At the same time, search for attractive yields 
also encouraged overinvestment in emerging 
markets. Carry traders, seeking higher yields by 
going out along the credit risk spectrum, use 
credit in short-term US debt to invest in risky 
emerging market bonds. Recovering from the 
shock of Argentina’s default, there has been a 
surge in portfolio flows to emerging markets 
at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 
(see IMF 2004 and Figure 2).
What are the risks involved? If asset valuations 
become based on excess liquidity rather than 
fundamentals, the withdrawal of monetary 
stimulus could trigger a widespread reassess-
ment of asset valuations. A drastic rise in inter-
est rates might trigger fire sales on risk mar-
kets. In the attempt to unwind carry trades and 
leveraged positions, a dramatic jump in prices 
may result in the following types of risk:
1 Financial intermediation risk: the most im-
minent risk is that highly leveraged investors 
will become bankrupt (let it be leveraged 
institutions on the housing market in the 
1 How to escape contagion in the interest 
rate trap
“The presence of crossover investors poses 
potential risks to the emerging markets asset 
class as their investments are often tactical in 
nature and as such they could shift holdings 
quickly in response to event risk, better op-
portunities elsewhere, or a growing perception 
that upside surprises are much less likely than 
downside ones given the sharp rise in valuations 
of emerging market assets over the past year 
and a half.” Institute of International Finance, 
15 April 2004
During the last couple of years, “deflation 
trap” has been the catch word for many central 
bankers. In the aftermath of the bursting of the 
bubble of asset prices starting in April 2000, 
serious concern about the risk of worldwide 
stagnation (the fear of a Japanese scenario) 
motivated an unusually aggressive policy of 
exceptionally low short-term interest rates. This 
policy has been extended for a “considerable” 
period. Abundant liquidity was a key factor for 
resurgent economic growth and for a rebound 
of global asset prices. 
Recently, however, there is increasing concern 
that the aggressive policy of low interest rates 
has encouraged excessive risk-taking – thus 
building up serious imbalances, resulting in 
high vulnerability of the world economy: low 
short-term interest rates and a steep yield curve 
provide powerful incentives for a strategy of 
borrowing short and lending long. Feedback 
trading may have pushed asset valuations 
beyond levels justified by improvements in 
fundamentals. The policy of easy money en-
courages the boosting of leverage. It makes it 
attractive to undertake carry trades in order to 
finance excessive investment in risky markets 
(let it be shares, housing or emerging markets). 
1.1 The 1994 scare
In that view, the Fed, having just escaped the 
“deflation trap”, is now caught in an “interest 
rate trap”. Strong economic growth could have 
the effect that inflation might rise significantly 
and so may call for a rapid tightening so 
as not to be left “behind the curve”. But an 
unanticipated spike in yields in the US treasury 
market might trigger the unwinding of carry 
trades and leveraged positions and so lead to 
an abrupt widening of credit spreads both in 
mature and emerging markets. Some fear that 
such a scenario of rapidly rising interest rates 
may lead to a financial meltdown. Such fears 
are driven by the experience of 1994. In that 
year (the last time the Fed ended a long period 
of low interest rates), long-term interest rates 
spiked up dramatically after an unexpected 
tightening in February, from 5.7% in February 
to more than 8% by November. At the same 
time, a sell-off in global bond markets doubled 
yield spreads on emerging bond markets from 
405 basis points at the end of 1993 to 800 
basis points in December 1994. The tightening 
of monetary policy sparked both the Orange 
County and the Tequila crisis. 
After years of intensive research focussed on 
ways how to get around the deflation trap, 
caused by the “zero-interest rate bound”, it 
seems that we now have to turn to a novel twist: 
the “interest rate trap”, postulating a conflict 
between two key central bank objectives: 
price stability and financial stability. Is there 
a fool-proof way to escape the unpleasant 
consequences of this trap? If indeed there is 
a conflict between price stability and financial 
stability, the challenge is how to organise an 
orderly reduction of imbalances without either 
triggering financial collapse or feeding excessive 
inflation.



























































































































































games, the present paper argues that when 
traders are highly leveraged, unexpected news 
are likely to cause dramatic informational 
spillover effects resulting in significant over-
shooting of price effects. Under such conditions, 
public information may create serious multi-
plier effects. So during periods of distress, 
financial markets are characterised by substantial 
destabilising properties. 
Traders tend to build up similar positions. Such 
herding need not be the result of bounded 
rationality. It can be driven by perfectly rational 
incentives on an individual base – possibly as 
the result of the payments structure of fund 
managers: if payments are linked to relative 
performance, it pays to go with the markets. 
But it will definitely be encouraged even fur-
ther when there is a public commitment to 
an extended period of calm policy. Once this 
commitment will be withdrawn, the incentive 
to rush to the exit in the attempt to unwind 
the own positions may then cause excessive 
price movements. For each single trader, it is 
individually rational to ignore the externalities 
involved in such moves.
The task for policymakers to prevent contagion 
under such conditions involves an extremely 
precarious intertemporal balance: a clear public 
signal of an imminent rise of interest rates 
would immediately spark the very contagion 
effects we want to avoid. Instead, the challenge 
is to introduce sufficient noise in central banks 
statements indicating the risk of rising inter-
est rates without being precise about the 
exact timing. A policy of gradualism is called 
for: the implementation of interest rate steps 
should wait until the most precarious leveraged 
positions have been unwounded. 
Unfortunately, it will be extremely difficult to 
get the dynamics right: the task is to make 
leveraged investors aware of the risks involved in 
playing along the yield curve, without triggering 
a sell-off. Under what conditions might such a 
strategy work out? Private information needs 
to be sufficiently dispersed, but it should be in 
such a way that the most leveraged investors 
have the more precise information. This will be 
the case if institutional investors have better 
strategies to identify noisy statements with 
implicit messages.
The most recent Fed policy seems to be fairly in 
line with what our theory suggests, after some 
period of mistaken communication policy. No 
doubt, the statement “policy accommodation 
can be maintained for a considerable period” 
made by the Federal Open Market Committee on 
9 December 2003 contributed to the increase in 
underlying risk, thus aggravating vulnerabilities. 
It certainly did not ease the task to initiate a 
turnaround in interest rates. Recently, however, 
speeches and statements seem to follow the 
script just outlined.2 Gradualism may contribute 
to unwind financial imbalances. Otherwise, 
there has to be an excessively long period of 
too low interest rates! 
In principle, according to the theory of global 
games, the best strategy to prevent a sell-off 
would be to give very precise private signals 
to the most leveraged traders, whereas the 
public statements remain rather vague (the 
overshooting effect arises from the fear of trad-
ers that others react faster to public informa-
tion). The problem with such a strategy is that 
the unwinding of positions is bound to have 
redistributional effects: those selling first gain 
at the expense of those coming late and in 
particular of those who are buying. Of course, 
stability of the financial system would be res-
2  See in particular Alan Greenspan’s remark before the Joint Economic Committee, US Senate on 21 April 2004: 
 “Rates must rise at some point to prevent pressures on price inflation from eventually emerging“, at the same time 
 signalling that no increase is imminent, and the statement of the Federal Open Market Committee on 4 May 2004: 
 “The Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.” 
USA1 or the carry traders on emerging mar-
kets). The main concern here is that once one 
key player gets into trouble, it may trigger a 
chain reaction threatening a worldwide finan-
cial meltdown just as during the LTCM crisis in 
1998. 
2 Debtor risk: rapidly increasing spreads may 
cause financial distress to debtors relying on a 
constant flow of funds. In the USA, holders of 
adjustable-rate mortgages may get in trouble 
as a result of an excessive spike in long-term 
interest rates. Drying up of funds (sudden stops) 
to emerging markets may substantially worsen 
the fundamentals in some regions relying on 
outside funds to promote internal growth. 
In an interest rate trap, central banks are faced 
with the following dilemma. Any wrong move 
(either a too tight or a too lax policy) might be 
the trigger on the road to disaster:
 a) Raising interest rates too much runs the risk  
 of a credit crunch on domestic markets. At 
 the same time, contagion effects may spread 
 across emerging markets (inducing large- 
 scale capital flight from the periphery to the 
 core – as in the East Asian financial crises  
 of 1997).
b) Leaving interest rates too low runs the risk of 
 further fuelling existing imbalances. This may 
 not only fuel a long- (or better medium-) run  
 risk for price stability, but in addition poses  
 the threat of simply postponing and at the  
 same time aggravating the day of reckoning. 
The present paper focuses on financial inter-
mediation risk – the question how to contain 
contagion. Following work by Morris and Shin 
(1999, 2004) based on the theory of global 
Figure 2. Net capital flows to emerging market economies; non-bank creditors                     Source: IIF 2004.
¹  On the surface, it may seem that highly leveraged institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are safely cushioned against such 
 risks by engaging in sophisticated hedging strategies – making sure that by active derivative trading they are sufficiently 
 diversified to survive stressful developments. But such complacency ignores two critical points. (1) Investors who hold mortgage-related  
 securities usually use dynamic hedging strategies. These strategies rely heavily on markets being very liquid and may run into 
 trouble exactly when liquid markets dry out. (2) It neglects the counterparty risk and may be unpleasantly disturbed 

















But expectations of an extended period of low 
interest rates made such an exposure even more 
attractive, resulting in an artificial compression 
of risk aversion and further encouraging incen-
tives to take leveraged positions: “carry trades” 
based on expectations of a sustained period of 
low interest rates raised increasing concern about 
the risk of a sudden withdrawal of funds trigger-
ing widespread contagion (see IMF 2004 and IIF 
2004). Are these concerns justified? How does 
contagion work? Here, we are interested in 
contagion defined as excessive comovements 
of seemingly unrelated assets with the risk of a 
systemic financial collapse.
Comovements of emerging market bonds are 
not necessarily due to contagion effects in 
the sense of the definition given above. In the 
terminology of Masson (1999), we have to 
differentiate between contagion effects and 
other causes, namely 
1 monsoonal effects (movements due to a   
 common cause such as policies undertaken  
 in industrial countries that affect different   
 emerging market countries in a similar way)  
 and  
2 spillovers (a change in macroeconomic   
 fundamentals affecting fundamentals of   
 other countries, for instance via trade links). 
 
Instead, our focus here is on financial links, more 
precisely on contagion caused by the overshoot-
ing of asset prices. When the same investors are 
active in otherwise unrelated markets, their 
liquidity shocks will pass through to these 
markets.
At first sight, it seems to be difficult to disen-
tangle monsoonal effects from contagion via 
asset prices: how should we differentiate? If in-
terest rates not only in the USA but worldwide 
are low, there is good reason to believe that 
this will also improve fundamentals in emerging 
markets. This effect can be explained through 
various channels: the reduced debt burden due 
to low interest rates reduces the probability of 
sovereign debt default; high export demand to 
industrial countries provides a strong demand 
stimulus, the procyclical risk appetite of invest-
ors drives substitution into riskier assets, and so 
on. After the Tequila crisis, many studies have 
analysed the link between US interest rates and 
EMBI spreads. The econometric evidence has 
been somewhat mixed; but there are strong 
indications that this link became more impor-
tant recently. A study by McGuire and Schrijvers 
(2003), using high-frequency data, shows that 
secondary-market spreads on emerging market 
sovereign bonds tend to be highly correlated 
across countries. They show that one third 
of the total variation in spreads (correlation 
between daily spread changes for a sample 
of 15 countries) is driven by common forces. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the common factor 
is correlated with US interest rates (negatively) 
and in particular positively with measures of risk 
tolerance. There is a high correlation with the 
VIX index 4 (see Figure 5). 
So it seems quite natural that news of a rise in the 
US rates may drive emerging market countries 
into difficulties and so give an incentive to 
withdraw.5 But what we are interested here is in 
cued (at least for the moment), if the key play-
ers are given sufficient time to sell the bonds 
to small private investors. If there are enough 
naïve (low-leveraged) investors around to chew 
up the hot potatoes, there would be no need 
for a sell-off. The same principle applies also to 
a transfer of the interest rate risk inherent in 
mortgages from highly leveraged GSE to fami-
lies happily engaging in adjustable-rate mort-
gages. It may be no coincidence that adjust-
able-rate mortgages (ARMs) propelled from a 
low of 12% in 2001 to 35.2% of all mortgage 
applications in May 2004 (see Figure 3), while 
at the same time, the NCUA (National Credit 
Union Association) Board cautioned that credit 
unions must manage today’s risk of holding too 
many fixed-rate mortgages in their portfolios as 
interest rates rise.3 
In general, most economists do not care much 
about redistributional effects. But what we 
should care about are long-run moral hazard 
effects: bailing out leveraged investors by a 
policy of excessive gradualism may encourage 
excessive risk-taking in the future. So the real 
issue is: how to give ex ante incentives not 
to engage in carry trades? May this justify to 
teach highly leveraged investors a lesson (“Do 
never rely on being bailed out!”) by giving them 
a haircut? Trying to bail in the key leveraged 
players would be a highly risky game, putting at 
stake the stability of the global financial system. 
The potential costs would be much higher than 
in the case of Argentine bondholders: the real 
costs would not be limited to the population 
of one country (like Argentine) picked out as 
guinea pig. As argued below, instead the 
problem should be tackled by imposing strong-
er procyclical liquidity regulations.
2 Contagion in emerging markets
Until January 2004, there has been an unusual 
strong compression of EMBI spreads. Declining 
volatility increased the risk appetite of investors as a 
rational response to improved market conditions. 
Figure 3. Share of adjustable-rate mortgages in the USA  Source: Datastream and Mortgage Bankers Association.
3  According to Reuters, Frank Nothaft, Freddie Mac’s chief economist, commented on 11 March 2004: “Families looking to lower   
 their monthly payments even further might consider adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). We predict ARMs will make up a much
  larger share of originations this year, perhaps the highest since about 1995.“ 
4  VIX: the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index is a market estimate of future volatility. It is based on a weighted   
 average of the implied volatilities of eight OEX calls and puts.
5 We are not concerned with such procyclical fluctuations of funds per se. They may be seen as an efficient response to changes   
 in market conditions. Instead, the focus here is on sudden excess fluctuations as a result of a sell-off. Of course, as Eichengreen/  
 Mody (1998) argue, procyclical fluctuations can cause problems in itself for emerging markets: “If price and availability of funds   
 depends heavily on external financial conditions, then emerging markets may find themselves alternatively swamped by and  
 starved of foreign capital. They may be vulnerable to inflow-induced consumption booms, asset-price bubbles, and real  
 overvaluation when industrial-country interest rates are low and to sudden reversals in the direction of flows sufficient  
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contagion, in the sense of rapid and (excessive) 
unexpected movements characterised by over-
shooting – possibly resulting in sudden stops. 
Leveraged investors play a key role here. Re-
markably, Ferrucci (2003) finds that long-term 
US treasury rates are negatively correlated with 
spreads. A steeper US yield curve is associated 
with lower emerging market spreads (see Figure 
6). He attributes that effect to the presence of 
leveraged investors, who borrow at short-term 
rates to lend at longer-term rates.
In an interesting paper, Kaminsky, Reinhart 
and Vegh (2003) identified three key factors 
triggering contagion defined in the following 
way. A chain reaction in other countries has 
been triggered by the “unholy trinity“: 
(a) they follow a large surge in capital flows, 
(b) they come as a surprise, and 
(c) they involve a leveraged common creditor. 
In contrast, when similar events have elicited 
little international reaction, they were widely 
anticipated and took place at a time when 
capital flows had already subsided.
Unfortunately, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 
(2003) do not pose (let alone answer) the most 
pressing question from a policy point of view: 
Why have some events been widely anticipated, 
whereas others came as a drastic shock? In the 
case of those that have been anticipated, why 
did contagion not set in before – at the time they 
became anticipated? As examples for anticipat-
ed shocks with limited external consequences 
they cite the default in Argentina, December 
2001, and the devaluations in Brazil 1999 and 
in Turkey 2001. These examples illustrate an 
important point: public policy plays a crucial 
role. Take the example of Argentina: IMF inter-
ventions before the default have been crucial 
to contain contagion by giving time to unwind 
excessively leveraged positions. If you are stuck 
in an interest rate trap, the same recipe will 
Figure 6. JPM EMBI + COMPOSITE - STRIPPED SPREAD and Term Structure 
(10 YR US BOND YIELD GOV – 3 MONTH US TREASURY BILL)                  Source: Datastream.
Figure 5. JPM EMBI + COMPOSITE - STRIPPED SPREAD and VIX VOLATILITY index                 Source: Datastream.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































er you would be forced to liquidate once bond 
prices have been falling, and thus the stronger 
is the incentive for you to forestall such an un-
pleasant event. Obviously, traders with high 
short-term exposure have to be particularly 
concerned about the risk of others selling their 
assets. They will try to unwind their positions 
before prices are falling too much. This pres-
sure to rush to the exit may trigger a run on the 
market, exacerbating the price movement. 
Such a scenario is a typical example of a coord-
ination game with multiple equilibria: for an 
intermediate range of fundamentals (here 
we are interested in the federal funds rate as 
the key fundamental variable), the outcome 
depends strongly on the beliefs of all traders. 
This indeterminacy is satisfactory neither from 
the point of view of theory nor of policymakers: 
if all depends on expectations, it is neither clear 
what will nor what should be done. Fortunately, 
however, recent advances in game theory show 
that we can get much more precise answers 
by using intuitively plausible selection criteria. 
The idea, initially developed by Hans Carlsson 
and Eric Van Damme in the theory of global 
game, is straightforward. It has been adapted 
and extensively refined to financial markets by 
Morris and Shin.6 
If agents do not have common knowledge 
about fundamentals, there is (under fairly 
general conditions) a unique equilibrium even 
for the intermediate range of fuzziness. All 
agents get some private signal about the true 
state of fundamentals, but they do not know 
the signal of other agents. It turns out that a 
simple trigger strategy is optimal in that case. If 
my signal indicates that interest rates are likely 
to rise above some critical value, then I should 
sell my bonds. Otherwise, I should stay in the 
market. 
To assume that all agents have private signals 
(the lack of common knowledge) seems to 
be a most natural assumption. Sure enough, 
everybody should be able to figure out the 
current federal funds rate – just look it up in any 
newspaper. So there should be common know-
ledge about that rate among all investors. But 
the key variable relevant here is the future path 
of the funds rate. Usually, nobody has perfect 
knowledge about that path (with the excep-
tion of some odd period when a central bank 
commits to hold the rate constant for a consid-
erable period). Market participants have access 
to a large set of information variables; but usu-
ally they have slightly different perceptions (the 
private information set is dispersed). These small 
differences in information generate uncertainty 
about others’ beliefs. As Morris and Shin have 
shown, in the absence of common knowledge, 
there exists a unique equilibrium under plausible 
conditions, with each investor using the simple 
trigger strategy characterised above. 
Some investors get bad signals and sell; others 
– those receiving better signals – stay in the mar-
ket. An interesting feature of this game is that if 
a critical mass of investors is getting bad signals 
and sell, there will be a dramatic fall in the bond 
price. At some critical stage, there is an abrupt 
switch from the good to the bad outcome.
But is the assumption of heterogenous private 
information really realistic in our context? 
Surely, any announcement by central bank 
officials should be common knowledge – it 
has to be public information. But even if the 
whole future path of short-term rates would 
be publicly announced, there is no common 
knowledge among investors about how the 
changes in interest rates will affect fundamen-
tals on specific markets. So in reality, there is a 
mix of both public and private information. This, 
however, can have fascinating, and, possibly 
embarrassing, impacts on public information.
help. Of course, at that time the IMF was heav-
ily accused of bailing out investors – exactly the 
same issue plays a role here.
What can be done to contain contagion? In 
traditional models of contagion, fund managers 
may follow fads driven by the relative per-
formance payment structure or as a result of 
bounded rationality (as motivated in theories 
of behavioural finance). The fragility of mass 
behaviour is captured by models of herding as a 
result of informational cascades. A characteristic 
of these models is that arbitrary changes in 
expectations, not related to fundamentals, lead 
to self-fulfilling jumps between multiple equi-
libria. These models yield important insights; 
but they introduce too much indeterminacy 
– the actions may be purely driven by sunspots 
unrelated to fundamental policy variables. 
Furthermore, in models with informational 
cascades the results are extremely sensitive to 
the sequential structure of the game. 
The following section instead uses a model of 
simultaneous actions of many (possibly small) 
traders. Private information, as modelled in 
the theory of global games, leads to a unique, 
predictable outcome in settings where multiple 
equilibria would prevail with common know-
ledge. This approach turns out to be extremely 
useful for helping to understand the key mech-
anism at work with contagion via changes in 
asset prices. Informational externalities cause 
multiplier effects of individual reactions. This 
set-up can be used to identify crucial market 
failures involved in contagion and to draw 
important policy implications.
3 Contagion – a perspective from the 
theory of global games
A typical characteristic of financial markets 
is that frequently, the own actions depend 
strongly on my beliefs about what others are do-
ing. This strategic complementarity introduces 
feedback mechanisms, possibly generating 
multiple equilibria due to self-fulfilling beliefs. 
Let me illustrate this feature using a specific ex-
ample. Let us have a look at highly leveraged 
investors, heavily exposed to emerging mar-
kets. If interest rates are expected to stay as low 
as they are at the time of writing the paper, 
these investors are on the safe side. They have 
no reason to get out of emerging markets. If, 
however, interest rates are expected to go up 
dramatically, investors will be forced to liquid-
ate their assets at any cost. But there may well 
be an intermediate range of interest rate paths, 
let me call it a range of fuzziness, for which 
there are multiple equilibria. In that case, the 
outcome strongly depends on each investor’s 
expectations about what others are doing on 
the bond market.
If you expect no sell-off (fairly stable spreads), 
you may be happy to keep your assets even 
in case interest rates go up. But if you expect 
others to sell, with the consequence of falling 
bond prices, you prefer to be the first to sell. 
This first-come-first-served mechanism drives 
the asset prices down instantaneously. Lever-
age plays a key role in this line of reasoning: the 
more leveraged you are as investor, the strong-
6  See Morris/Shin (1999, 2004) and also Heinemann/Illing (2002).
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Subjects do not distinguish between public and 
private information (with high precision). Trans-
parency, however, has a crucial impact. It can 
be understood as an increase in the precision 
of information (private or public) and results in 
more precise private beliefs (as in Heinemann/
Illing [2002]), resulting in the multiplier effects 
discussed above. So in order to contain the over-
shooting effect and to prevent rush to the exit, 
central banks should introduce sufficient noise 
in their signals before interest rates are raised. 
Ideally, if feasible, pivotal private investors 
should be given highly precise signals as private 
(inside) information in order to give them time 
to unwind their positions without triggering the 
strategic multiplier effects putting financial sta-
bility at risk. Such a policy may, however, have 
damaging long-run moral hazard effects. But a 
similar mechanism works if the most heavily le-
veraged players are in a better position to infer 
the relevant information from noisy public sig-
nals than others. Usually, experienced financial 
market participants have complementary infor-
mation which puts them in a position to interpret 
central bank statements more precisely than less 
well-trained traders. So announcements may be 
framed in such a way as to guide them to have 
enough time to clean their leveraged positions 
before contagion sets in. Of course, that requires 
an extremely precarious intertemporal commu-
nication strategy. If it does not yield the desired 
outcome, there is no escape from the interest 
rate trap. In that case, a slower adjustment of 
interest rates (a policy of gradualism) is needed 
to guarantee financial stability even if persisting 
signs would indicate a high risk for price stabil-
ity. Contrary to Bernanke (2004), you cannot 
have the cake and eat it at the same time. 
Our analysis provides an additional lesson for 
the role of communication to central banks. 
Whenever there is a need for coordination 
among expectations of private investors, public 
information plays a crucial coordinating role. 
This holds not only for interest rate changes, but 
also issues such as how the role of new technol-
ogies may affect price stability and the natural 
rate of output. In the presence of uncertainty, 
central bankers should not talk too much about 
new paradigms, picking out structural breaks as 
a central theme – it will serve as focal point for 
financial markets as a justification for excessive 
asset prices – they soak up the slightest hint like 
a sponge. 
3.3 Externalities involved
Why do traders, being aware of the risk of mar-
kets becoming illiquid, not try to insure against 
this risk by holding more liquid assets? Should 
not market discipline force them to reduce le-
verage and instead hold more liquid assets? The 
problem is that the amount of insurance cho-
sen by each individual agent will be insufficient. 
The selling pressure imposes externalities on the 
other traders. The individual trader has no incen-
tive to internalise these externalities, resulting 
in a suboptimal level of liquidity. As argued by 
Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2004), regulation 
in the form of minimum capital requirement 
ratios or other solvency constraints may, at times 
of market turbulence, exacerbate the contagion 
effects, becoming itself an important source of 
systemic risk. A decline in asset prices may wipe 
out the capital meant to serve as a buffer. In 
that case, insisting on the fulfilment of capital 
requirement will aggravate the selling pressure. 
Instead, procyclical liquidity requirements might 
mitigate spillovers and so help to correct these 
externalities.
3.4 Conclusions
Central banks play an important role as coord-
ination mechanism in the presence of informa-
3.1 Multiplier effects of signals
New public signals will lead you to reassess the 
probabilities of fundamentals. But beyond the 
simple updating of your own a priori probability, 
public information, if it is sufficiently precise, has 
an additional effect: it also conveys some infor-
mation about how others will react. This stra-
tegic aspect multiplies the initial impact. It will 
result in a more than proportional adjustment 
of your own assessment and so lead to stronger 
reactions. Even seemingly small changes in the 
public signal may thus result in strong move-
ments of market positions, possibly triggering 
large crises. To the outside observer, the ag-
gregate effect seems to be an overreaction of 
the market to new information. Intuitively, if we 
are already close to the critical stage where the 
abrupt switch from the good to the bad out-
come is happening, some small news indicating 
a slight deterioration in fundamentals may result 
in an update of enough investors to trigger that 
switch. There will be a drastic change in mood, 
even though fundamentals did not deteriorate 
much.
This change in mood will be the more dramatic, 
the higher the leverage and the faster the speed 
of information transmission. Active traders on 
financial markets are familiar with this phenom-
enon from own experience, but the theory of 
global games allows for a precise modelling of 
the strategic effect: if market participants are 
concerned about the actions of other investors, 
they take into account how others might react 
to public news (you form beliefs about how the 
news might affect the beliefs and thus the ac-
tions of other traders). Public signals play the 
role of coordinating expectations. Again, the in-
tuition is straightforward: if I am concerned that 
my competitors react to the news by selling, I 
have an incentive to act even faster to be the 
first. Because of this strategic incentive to move 
first, traders put a stronger weight on public in-
formation than rational signal procession with-
out the interdependency of creditor behaviour 
would suggest. It aggravates price movements 
and may result in runs on markets. 
This coordination aspect is of utmost import-
ance when prices are sensitive to the flow 
volume of trade: potential losses arising from 
sudden changes in asset prices induce traders 
to react strongly to the risk of selling pressure 
by others. For leveraged investors, a fall in asset 
value increases the pressure to sell, reinforcing 
the initial impact. During these events, the 
liquidity of the market dries up. When prices 
are falling rapidly, traders will be forced to sell 
even assets of different, not closely related risk 
classes. Obviously, the multiplier is stronger the 
higher the leverage.
3.2 Lessons for central bank policy
When private information is very precise relative 
to public information, the multiplier effect is 
small. So when the noise in the public signals 
of market participants is large, the breaks are 
less pronounced. The noise generates a great-
er dispersion of estimates of the underlying 
fundamentals, and hence there is less unanimity 
in judgements as to whether the critical thresh-
old of the switching strategy has been breached. 
In contrast, when the noise is small, the market 
outcome suffers a much sharper break, since the 
distribution of estimates conditional on the true 
realisation of fundamentals is that much more 
concentrated around the mean. This gives rise 
to much more precipitous breaks in the market 
outcome. 
Experimental evidence, however, shows that 
common (public) information does not necessar-
ily lead to common beliefs (common knowledge) 
as is presupposed by the theory of global games 
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tional externalities. They should not prevent an 
orderly unwinding of imbalances – in contrast, 
they should contribute to make the unwinding 
orderly. But this strategy poses a serious risk: a 
policy limited trying to soften ex post the im-
pact of negative systemic shocks may contribute 
itself to building up new structural imbalances. 
If that is the case, the solution of the underlying 
problems would simply be postponed in the 
future. Even worse: it may encourage building 
up even more serious imbalances, thus aggra-
vating the underlying risks. So the challenge for 
policy and for future research is to try to identify 
instruments for economic policy which help 
to prevent the building up of imbalances right 
from the beginning. 
A key issue in this context is to identify financial 
imbalances in time. In order to cope with the in-
formation externalities described above, stricter 
regulation is needed. More stringent capital re-
quirements, however, may be counterproductive 
if the risk of declining asset prices is at the core 
of the problem. A promising way to go could be 
to impose procyclical liquidity requirements. In 
contrast, monetary policy using just one instru-
ment (interest rates) would be overburdened 
trying to address both financial and price stabil-
ity. Even though it may be well suited to prevent 
financial meltdowns, extensive use of this instru-
ment is likely to encourage risk taking ex ante, 
thus encouraging bubbles and excessive valu-
ations on other asset markets (see Illing [2004]). 
So monetary policy will be seriously handicapped 
if it is not supported by adequate regulation. 
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